Lower Omo Valley, Ethiopia: Pushing forward with Development at the Expense of Agro-Pastoralist Communities

The Lower Omo basin lies in the Rift Valley of North-Eastern Africa. The region is semi-arid with a low and erratic rainfall regime characterized by a mean annual precipitation of less than 250 mm. The Omo River flows South from the Ethiopian highland towards Lake Turkana, a brackish endorheic lake receiving 90% of its inflow from that river. The lake is shared between Kenya and Ethiopia and is a critical biodiversity hotspot. The lowlands of the Omo Valley and the area surrounding Lake Turkana are home to an estimated 500,000 people, with at least eight distinct indigenous communities  whose livelihood systems are based on a combination of mobile pastoralism, flood-retreat and rain-fed farming, and fishing—a portfolio of economic strategies that allow them to exploit seasonally fluctuating resources (Hodbod et al., 2019). The Omo would flood between March and September, and cultivation would typically begin as the flood began to recede in October.

Since 2006, Ethiopia’s government-sponsored development projects have rapidly created water scarcity in the Lower Omo River Valley in Ethiopia and around Lake Turkana, dramatically altering the traditional  livelihoods of the indigenous inhabitants. These projects are part of the “Climate Resilient Green Economy'' (CRGE) strategy advanced by the Government of Ethiopia (GoE 2011a), which aims to make Ethiopia a leader in low-carbon economic growth in Africa. Hydropower generation is a key priority in the CRGE as exemplified in the Gibe III dam, which was completed in 2015 and is to date (2022) the fourth largest hydropower plant in Africa by installed capacity. The dam is located about 300 km southwest of the capital, Addis Ababa and is meant to deliver electricity to more than 80 million people, thus increasing the national energy output by 85%. The dam also fits within a long-standing plan to use the Omo River for large-scale industrial irrigation. The Ethiopian Government’s Omo-Gibe Basin Master Plan (1996) considered the potential for upriver dams on the Omo River to provide enough irrigation water during the river’s low flow periods to support that planned Kuraz Sugar Development Project (KSDP)— the continent’s largest-ever state agricultural program, with a planned irrigated area almost as large as the total irrigated land area of neighboring Kenya. Together, Gibe III and KSDP were major components of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) plan for infrastructure development. On the Omo River, these include the already built Gibe I Dam and Gibe II power station (which draws its water from the Gibe I reservoir) and the yet to be built Gibe IV and V. Together these infrastructure components will significantly alter the streamflow regime of the Omo River (that is the timing and variability of its discharge), and its contribution to Lake Turkana downstream.

The Human Right Watch (HRW) estimates that about 200,000 residents of the Lower Omo and another 300,000 people living around Lake Turkana in Kenya are likely to be affected by the Omo River development (HRW 2012). As part of its plans for development, the government has initiated a villagisation programme intended to permanently settle the indigenous population of the lower Omo Valley, who predominantly practice livestock herding, flood-recession cultivation, and rain-fed agriculture. Based on the government’s understanding of water-centered development, communities are intended to be provided with irrigated fields, basic infrastructure, and social services (i.e. medical care and schooling). The aim is to promote a combination of semimobile livestock herding, subsistence agriculture, and contract farming (i.e. sugarcane outgrower schemes). However, indigenous communities have allegedly been forced by the government and the military to leave their ancestral territories under threat of harassment, violence, and arbitrary arrests. Pastoral communities who used the river Omo for their subsistence became resettled in different places. Their grazing lands and their cattle were reduced, and they lost access to the river. This collapse of indigenous livelihood in the lower Omo basin and around Lake Turkanahas has food and water security implications that might exacerbate pre-existing tensions between indogenous communities (Oakland Institute, 2019) and facilitate armed conflicts over rapidly disappearing resources. Indeed, between 1989 and 2011 alone, conflicts between Nyangatom, Daasanach and Turkana caused more than 600 direct deaths (Oakland Institute, 2019). At the international level, Lake Turkana is shared by Ethiopia with neighboring Kenya, and is currently not regulated by an international treaty. Despite no international treaty governing the use of the Omo river either, in 2009 Kenya Government agreed to purchase a fixed amount of electricity powered by Gibe III, which reveals its (at least tacit) support for the infrastructure project.

Three categories of hydro-industrial processes (CHIPs) can be identified in the region:

• Reservoir filling: The reservoirs associated with the multiple dams will affect downstream water availability during their filling period. This is a short term impact on downstream total water availability.
• Reservoir operations: The reservoirs associated with the multiple dams temporarily store water to maximize hydropower production. This has a long term impact on the timing and variability of downstream water availability.
• Irrigation: Some of the water collected by the reservoir is not returned to the river but diverted towards irrigation canals supplying the KSDP (among others). This has a long term impact on downstream total water availability.

Two stakeholder impact categories (SICs) can similarly be distinguished within the basin:

• Riverine communities use the river to sustain their agro-pastoralist livelihood. These communities use the river for flood recession agriculture, cattle grazing and fishing. The Lower Omo has long been regarded as a food insecure region due to frequent droughts. However, flood-retreat agriculture along the Omo was the primary and most reliable source of food, particularly during periods of low rainfall. The total annual sorghum crop, the main agricultural staple in the area, came from this source.
• Lacustrine communities rely on the fisheries of Lake Turkana to sustain their traditional livelihood. Indeed, inadequate rainfall in central and northern Turkana precludes rainfed agriculture and the shorelines of Lake Turkana’s saline waters are also unsuitable for planting.

Note that each SIC can encompass a variety of distinct indigenous communities who are similarly impacted by the CHIPs. In what follows, we summarize the types of water insecurity (green, blue, economic, virtual and cultural) that characterize the impact of each CHIP on each SIC.

Reservoir Filling

Historically, the filling of large dams has generated serious international tensions. After the Gibe III dam began impounding water (2015–2016), an upsurge of local and international groups contested the insufficiency of the summer flood pulse necessary to support downstream riparian activities, as well as a 2 m level drop in the downstream Lake Turkana (Avery, 2017; Zaniolo et al., 2021). The impacts of Gibe III filling on riverine and lacustrine communities are slightly different because of the different reliance on water resources between the indigenous populations.

On riverine communities

The filling of Gibe III dam has permanently dampened seasonal flow variability in the Omo River, eliminating the annual flood pulse. Thus, the loss of annual flood has prevented traditional flood recession cultivation, disconnected river-fed lakes used for crop cultivation, and affected fisheries in the Lower Omo Valley. Hence an overall decrease in blue water availability (Table 1) had also cascading effects not only on the economy and trade activity of the region, but especially on the livelihood of the riverine indigenous population. The increased dependence on unreliable rain-fed agriculture in response to the loss of Omo River floods has made communities more vulnerable to drought. Before the filling of the dam, local people did not practice rainfed agriculture unless the Omo river-bank harvest was poor. They were reluctant to invest time and resources in rainfed cultivation because it was very unreliable, and they usually had a good supply of grain from the flood-retreat cultivation. To ameliorate this situation, the government of Ethiopia has provided plots of irrigated farm land to the indigenous people to compensate for the loss of this flooding. However, these plots are often too small to feed the families that reside on them and the persistent breakdowns of irrigation equipment have decreased what little yield there was to begin with. This has led to a decrease in economic water security. As a result, some indigenous people have abandoned their plots due to hunger and the reluctance to end their pastoral way of life. While the government promised many jobs on the sugar plantations, these jobs did not materialize for the most part, leaving indigenous communities with very limited livelihood options to purchase food (hence a decrease in virtual water security). Finally, communities are also facing cultural water insecurity (Table 1) as there is no longer enough water available to sustain their traditional livelihood. Indeed, movements by agro-pastoralists in search of grazing and farmland are currently occurring (Hodbod et al., 2019). Finally, these population movements often lead to conflict (Abbink 2009), both between indigenous communities that fight over the remaining water resources, and between the indigenous groups and the Ethiopian government that is held responsible for the failure in the resettlement process and for promoting national and international economic interests in the region at the expense of local communities. (Buffavand 2017).

On lacustrine communities

The impacts of the filling of Gibe III on Lake Turkana reflect the crucial role of the Omo in the lake's hydrology, not only as its dominant source of water but also because of the massive seasonal pulse it provides of fresh and nutrient-rich water. Lake Turkana receives nearly 90% of its annual water inflow from the Lower Omo River. Therefore, the lake’s fluctuating levels largely reflect the runoff from the rainy season over Ethiopia's southern highlands which flow into the Lower Omo River. The impact of Gibe III on the blue water security of the indigueous population that lives along the shores of Lake Turkana are evident and documented. Indeed, during 2015–16 when the huge Gibe III reservoir was filled, Lake Turkana's water level declined 2 m consistently with the predictions of several scholars (Avery 2009; Avery 2012). How rapidly the lake’s level drops will reflect how quickly Ethiopia chooses to fill the dam and the amount of rain that falls in the years in question. For example, the first filling of Gibe III coincided with one of the three strongest global climatic El Niño and Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events since the 1950s, which was characterized by a prolonged downwards phase in precipitation abundance. Intuitively, this represented an unfortunate timing to rapidly impound a large water volume into a reservoir. Zaniolo et al. (2021) showed that an investigation of climate oscillations could have informed a more favorable filing timing, as well as adaptive filling operations, and significantly contained the associated social and environmental costs in the Omo-Turkana region. This drop in the water level has not only directly increased the blue water insecurity of the areas surrounding the Lake, but also increased the food scarcity (virtual water insecurity) for the local indigenous communities. Fishing communities depend on the maintenance of delicate environmental and biological balances in shoreline habitats, with even small shifts affecting fish catch levels. Trading relations between fishing communities and pastoral/fishing communities are essential to both. Even if there are no official fisheries statistics yet available for the Gibe III filling period, field observations and media reports confirmed a decline in fisheries catch during the Gibe III filling period (Avery and Tebbs, 2018). As with the riverine population in the Lower Omo Valley, several lacustrine communities are also expected to migrate. For example, during the earliest phase of the reservoir-fill period (Carr 2017), and the simultaneous shoreline regression likely under reduced inflow conditions, populations on the northern shoreline of Lake Turkana started moving southward by about 8–10 km further into Kenya.

Gibe III Operations

Despite Gibe III dam being operational since 2016, research is still ongoing to actually determine what are the true impacts of a fully-operational Gibe III on the riverine and lake communities that live in the Omo-Turkana region. Therefore, what follows represents a summary of the expected effects of the dam. In particular, two types of processes can be distinguished: (1) dam operations for the irrigation of downstream cotton and sugarcane production and (2) dam operations for hydropower generation. For the former aspect, our assessments are based on model simulations obtained from the peer reviewed literature (Level 3 accuracy), while for the latter, due to the absence of peer reviewed literature, our assessments are made by relying on documented comparable contexts (Level 4 accuracy).

Gibe III Operations for Agricultural Irrigation

On riverine communities

To the Ethiopian government, Gibe III is supposed to enable the development of large-scale agro-industries to meet expanding consumer markets, especially an anticipated surge in the export of sugar and cotton. However, both cotton and sugarcane are crops with a demonstrated potential to have huge impacts on their surrounding and downstream environment. Both crops have large water requirements, which increase in arid areas where more water is lost to evaporation (Fong, 2015). When irrigation is used to grow these crops, the diversion of large amounts of water can have devastating impacts on downstream aquatic ecosystems. Carr (2017) suggested that once the Gibe III dam is completed and brought into operation, the diversion of water for irrigation purposes will radically reduce the Omo River’s downstream flow volume as well as the inflow to Lake Turkana, by at least 60–70 %, according to Africa Research Working Group (ARWG) physical scientists. Such loss of blue water volume (see Table 1) would destroy the livelihood of at least 80,000 residents relying on flood recession agriculture along the lower Omo River and in the modern Omo delta region, along with tens thousands of other indigenous pastoralist, fishers and others whose survival depends on trade for grain and other agricultural product from farms at the Omo. Therefore, the virtual water security of these indigenous communities will also  decrease. In addition, a drastic reduction of the inflow might also eliminate the pristine Omo riverine forest, which is the last of its type in Sub-Saharan Africa and one of the richest remaining wildlife areas of Ethiopia. Finally, major ‘outmigration’ is expected in response to their livelihoods collapsing in the Omo riverine and northern lake region, as well as major escalation and initiation of armed conflict among ethnic groups, to fight over the more scarce water resources.

On lacustrine communities

Estimates of irrigation will reduce the lake to 59% of its current volume, lowering the water level by 13m. More realistic assessments of water use efficiency in these irrigation projects suggest that the lake would reduce to a mere 42% of its current volume and decline 22m in depth (lake depth ~30m). The radical decrease in Omo River inflow to Lake Turkana would likely induce the lake to retreat—most prominently in the shallow northern and central portions of the lake. The northern shoreline of the lake would recede by around 8–10 km, for example, with multi-kilometer retreat of lake waters throughout much of the lake. Dam operations for irrigation will also dramatically change the annual flood cycle to the detriment of the lake. This substantial reduction of the flood cycle will permanently transform and could ultimately devastate the primary productivity of the lake and its fish, bird, crocodile, lakeshore, and other species. The reduction in the blue water volume into Lake Turkana will also affect its water quality by increasing the salinity concentration in waters that are already borderline in potability (Avery and Tebbs, 2018). The expected increased salinity will threaten food availability for consumption by hundreds of thousands of local residents, as well as by livestock and wildlife watering. This might lead to the collapse of the exchange system between fishing, agro-pastoral, agricultural and pastoral communities, leading to the destruction of food related reciprocity relations in a region that is not fully connected to global markets, and hence a decrease in virtual water security. To face the increasing induced water insecurity (whether blue or virtual) southern movement of villages along Lake Turkana’s western shoreline are expected, as fishing and fishing/pastoral indigenous communities (e.g. Turkana) desperately search for relief aid or any last option available in towns.

Gibe III Operations for Hydropower Generation

Extensive construction of dams by humans has greatly altered the natural dynamics of streamflow variability of rivers in continental to global scales (Poff et al., 2017). Flood control through hydropower dams does not alter the mean discharge downstream, but decreases the intra-seasonal variability of streamflows and, therefore, homogenizes regional flow dynamics. Thus, we are expecting that similar consequences would also apply to the Lower Omo river streamflow downstream of Gibe III, with an almost negligible implication in terms of mean annual discharge, but with a decrease in the reliability and availability of the flood pulse on which recession irrigation depends. Hence, hydropower operations are not expected to give rise to blue water insecurity, because the blue water is physically there (retained in the reservoir), but it cannot be accessed downstream by the communities, thus decreasing their economic and virtual water security. In addition, dam regulation strategies aimed at optimizing the power production might be responsible for producing significant hourly, daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal fluctuations in streamflows, which may potentially threaten the integrity of fluvial systems leading to notable morphological and ecological impacts (Botter et al., 2012). Furthermore, hydropower generation is influenced by the year-to-year variations in rainfall that increase the risk of climate-related electricity supply disruption in dry years (Conway et al., 2017). Hydrological variability can play a key role in magnifying or containing the stress of filling: if the filling occurs during a dry spell, the basin is further exposed to water shortage and intersectoral tensions. This is what happened in the 2015-2016 for Gibe III, where a rapid filling of the reservoir irresponsive to variations in the water availability paired with an ongoing drought inducing Gibe III association with the label of “most controversial dam in Africa” (The Economist). In their retrospective analysis, Zaniolo et al. (2021) demonstrate that the investigation of climate oscillations could have informed a more favorable filling timing, as well as adaptive filling operations, and significantly contained the associated social and environmental costs. 

Changes in the seasonality of inflows from the Omo will significantly impact the biodiversity of Lake Turkana. Given the breeding grounds for many of Lake Turkana’s fishes are found in areas that are seasonally covered by the fluctuating depth of the lake, the lake’s fish are at risk under the post-dam hydrological regime (Hobdon 2019). Fish stocks from Lake Turkana directly benefit about 200,000 members of the indigenous populations (e.g., Turkana, Dasanach, and El Molo) and are sold all over Kenya as well as in Uganda and the eastern D.R. Congo. Therefore, virtual water security is expected to decrease as a consequence to the operational Gibe III, with the potential to exacerbate conflicts over the scarcer water (and food) resources (cultural water insecurity).

Table 1. Summary of CHIPs vs SICs for Water Security in the Lower-Omo-Turkana Basin

Of crucial consideration to the issue of water security in the Lower Omo region is the question of governance, which we define here as the socio-political context in which decisions with regard to the Gibe III dam and the state-sponsored electricity production and irrigated commercial agriculture it supports are situated. This context includes but is not limited to the role, influence and interests of state and nonstate actors, public and private institutions and their responsibilities, decision making practices, and the interests, capacities and concerns of local communities affected by the Gibe III dam.

Historic Background

The Lower Omo and Lake Turkana region straddles the modern border of Ethiopia and Kenya and is immediately adjacent to the border with the Ilemi region of South Sudan.  This positioning is the result of the process of drawing borders in the colonial and early post-colonial period and has had implications for the lifestyles of local communities and their relationship to their respective national governments and each other. 

These international borders, along with prolonged drought, have caused indigenous communities in the region to be increasingly dependent in recent decades on the Omo River and Lake Turkana waters. The geopolitical context of the Ilemi region, a grassy area of considerable importance to pastoral groups, is illustrative of this. The region is disputed between South Sudan and Kenya and has been seen by both countries and Ethiopia as a strategic buffer zone, with access by indigenous pastoral groups greatly restricted.  This has pushed groups such as the Dasanech and Turkana out of the grazing areas and increased their reliance on the waters of Omo and Lake Turkana, leading to a potential conflict between them. Decreased land access for various indigenous groups of the region has led to ecological degradation and increased the pressure on scarce resources (Carr 2017). 

Both in Ethiopia and Kenya the riverine and lacustrine communities of the Lower Omo / Lake Turkana region occupy a peripheral space in their respective national communities, with considerable implications for their ability to participate in decision-making processes regarding the resources they rely on for survival.  In the case of Ethiopia, the Lower Omo communities, (comprising 8 different ethnic groups typically utilizing agro-pastoral practices for survival) are ethnically and linguistically distinct from the highland Ethiopians (Amhara and Tigrayan peoples) who traditionally dominate the state. For their part, the Ethiopian government appears to view the Lower Omo peoples and their agro-pastoral and pastoral lifestyles as backward (Carr 2017). Far be it from genuinely seeking ways to preserve their traditional livelihoods, it has at times seen the destruction of the pastoral lifestyle as a goal in and of itself (HRW 2012, Carr 2017).

Ethiopian National Development Policy

The harnessing of the Omo waters for exportable hydroelectric power and irrigation for commercial agriculture, particularly for sugar plantations, cotton, and palm oil, are in line with broader government policy decades in the making, which the Lower Omo communities as marginal political actors have had little voice in shaping.  Plans for the development of the Lower Omo region date back to at least the government’s 1996 Omo-Gibe Master Plan. (Fong 2015).  While the government typically promises that such plans will lead to improved standards of living for indigenous groups, such promises in the past have failed to be realized (HRW 2012).

Impact Assessments and Free and Prior Consent

The Ethiopian government has consistently failed to meet its obligations according to the Ethiopian constitution itself and its commitments to international agreements to carry out robust Environmental and Social Impact Assessments before beginning major infrastructure projects like the Gibe III dam and to obtain free, prior, and informed consent from the communities whose traditional lands are affected by such projects (HRW 2012).  Impact assessments that have been conducted by the government were done years after work had already begun on the project and were wholly inadequate, ignoring large portions of the land affected and ignoring the effects of the large-scale irrigated agriculture associated with the dam’s construction (Carr 2017).  The assessments have included patently false characterizations of the situation, including asserting that there is ample rainfall for rain-fed agriculture in the South Omo region and at times drastically underestimating the number of people actually living in the area.  The assessments can fairly be described as a box-checking exercise rather than a genuine attempt to fully understand the consequences of the project for Lower Omo and Lake Turkana indigenous communities  (HRW 2012, Carr 2017).

Similarly, efforts at informing and facilitating participation by the Lower Omo communities in the decision-making process have been superficial.  Community leaders described meetings at which attendance is restricted to hand-picked individuals and money is offered in exchange for positive responses.  These interactions have often been characterized by fear and intimidation and coupled with violent responses by the police and military to any opposition (HRW 2012).

Partly at play is the unclear legal status of the land in the Lower Omo valley.  According to the Ethiopian Constitution, all land belongs to the state.  However the constitution also recognizes the right of pastoralists to graze and cultivate freely without being displaced.  The state is also party to a variety of international agreements such as the aforementioned ISESCR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPCR), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights that stipulate protections for the Lower Omo communities from forced displacement without free, prior, informed consent or denial of their means of subsistence. These principles exist in some tension and are further complicated by a lack of registration of land tenure in the Lower Omo region formalizing its traditional use by the Lower Omo indigenous communities (HRW 2012).

Forced Displacement and Suppression of Opposition

Rather than include local indigenous communities in the planning and decision-making process with an aim of protecting their rights to the waters of the Omo basin and to the resources necessary to sustenance in their traditional homelands, the Ethiopian government has taken a hostile approach to the communities.

Vast sections of the valley have been expropriated by the state with the local populations forcibly removed to sites meant for sedentary settlement, depriving communities of the resources necessary to sustain their traditional agro-pastoral livelihoods.  For the Mursi and Kwegu peoples, for example, an estimated 73% of their agricultural sites had been expropriated to make space for sugar plantations  (Carr 2017).  The Kwegu people are reported to have been reduced to relying on food support from neighboring communities for survival.  (Survival International 2015)  People form the Bodi community as well have had sorghum fields dug up, cattle herds forcibly reduced, and gardens cleared away to make room for commercial agriculture, and have been forcibly removed from traditional lands (HRW 2012). Further downstream, at least 120,000 hectares, and likely much more due to the difficulty gathering information in the region because of government restrictions, have been expropriated from Dasanech and Nyangatom people’s for commercial agriculture.  The Dasanech are forced to move further into the Omo delta and northern Lake Turkana region where resources are already stretched and where they come into conflict with neighboring communities  (Carr 2017).

Opposition to these measures is met with intimidation and violence, with numerous reports from locals of police harassment, beatings, and arrests.  (HRW 2012)  Notably, these tactics predate the construction of the Gibe III dam itself.  In 2010 when 30,000 hectares of land were seized from the Suri community for a palm oil plantation, local community members were forcibly removed and after speaking out were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and 54 members of the community were killed during a protest  (Fong 2015).

Potential for Conflict

The increasing water and land scarcity and the forcible constriction of the local communities into smaller territories has increased the potential for armed conflict both between rival tribes competing for dwindling resources and between local communities and the state.  Some communities such as the Dasanech and Turkana in northern Kenya have long histories of both economic cooperation and conflict. As the Dasanech have been forced off lands south towards Turkana areas and north towards Nyangatom areas incidents of conflict between communities have increased.  These conflicts risk being exacerbated as conditions worsen and risk getting worse as Kenyan and Ethiopian forces get involved  (Climate Diplomacy 2021, Carr 2017).

Major Actors and Power Asymmetries

In addition to the Ethiopian state and the Lower Omo and Lake Turkana indigenous communities, there are a number of other institutional actors with various interests and levels of involvement and responsibility in the context. 

The Ethiopian government at first sought funding from the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank.  It later withdrew that request and signed an agreement with the Dongfang Electric Corporation to develop the project, with financing from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  (Fong 2015, HRW 2012). 

The World Bank and African Development Bank both remain involved however, despite their insistence to the contrary.  As funders of the Ethiopia-Kenya Eastern Electricity Project, through which Kenya will receive electricity generated by the Gibe III dam, they have considerable stake in the overall project.  Both development banks are also intricately involved in the development of commercial agricultural projects made possible by the dam through their funding of the Protecting Basic Services (PBS) program, a multi-billion dollar direct aid program conceived after other direct aid to the Ethiopian government was suspended by the Development Advisory Group for Ethiopia took issue with the state’s repressive policies  (Carr 2017). 

The Kenyan government, while not directly involved in the construction of the dam, nevertheless has a considerable interest in the electricity that it will produce.  It has already come to an agreement to purchase electricity from Ethiopia produced by the Gibe III  (Carr 2017).

Each of these actors bears varying levels of legal and ethical responsibility for the widespread reported human rights abuses occurring as a direct result of the construction of the Gibe III dam and the commercial agriculture projects associated with it.

All three CHIPS, in combination, heavily impact all three elements of the right to water. This has heavy consequences for cross-cutting obligations and governance concerns. Reservoir flooding, dam operations, and water diversion (for irrigation purposes) are likely going to severely impact water levels downstream, particularly for lacustrine communities. Reservoir flooding and dam operations would have affected seasonal flows downstreams and would have affected the accessibility of water, with ripple effects towards multi-dimensionality and sustainability, because while the net levels of water would have remained the same, there would still be a palpable decrease in immediately available water for downstream and lacustrine communities. It would also affect the types of ecosystems downstream if water levels went down. Water diversion, however, magnifies these impacts by aggravating water security issues. When water from the reservoir is diverted for irrigation, it entails a net loss in the water levels for downstream and lacustrine communities in the long run. Over the years, if the government does not maintain a program or plan to offset this loss, then damage to ecosystems and various livelihoods could become irreversible. Not only that, violence between and among tribes or communities will inevitably become certain–water being such a precious resource that communities would go to extreme lengths to secure their portion for their own uses.

These CHIPS also introduce sustainability concerns not just for water security issues, but also for indirect effects like displaced villagers and other communities. Ethiopia must ensure that displaced communities do not bear undue hardship as a result and that the displacement does not generate long-term issues for their ability to pursue, begin, or maintain different or new types of livelihoods.

Special attention should be directed towards the potential to cause transboundary harm. This issue highlights the weaknesses in the governance structure within Ethiopia–from a lack of consultation and proper studies regarding the long-term effects of the combined impact from the three CHIPS to a lack of consideration for the project’s implications for neighboring countries and their communities.

In conclusion, Ethiopia needs to do more work and assessments to ensure that the CHIPS align well with the elements of the Right to Water and ensure that the project, while generating power and revenue for the broader community, does not come at the cost or expense of communities who need access to essential water.